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The direct effects of EPAs on ACP countries arise from the requirement to eliminate tariffs 
on most imports from the EU. While consumers gain from cheaper imports, the government 
losses tariff revenue and producers face increased completion, implying adjustment costs. 
This paper estimates the consumer welfare and revenue impact for a sample of 34 ACP 
countries of eliminating tariffs on imports from the EU under an EPA, and discusses the 
associated adjustment costs. Although the ACP overall and on average experiences consumer 
welfare gains, the gains (or any losses) are small and associated with significant revenue 
losses and potential adjustment costs. As the gains are associated with increased imports from 
the EU, larger welfare gains tend to be associated with larger revenue losses and adjustment 
costs. There is scope for tax substitution to address revenue concerns, but addressing 
adjustment costs (especially employment) will be much more difficult. ACP countries can 
exclude up to 20% of imports from the EU from tariff elimination (sensitive products). The 
paper argues that regionally traded goods should be classified as sensitive and excluded from 
liberalization. Although this reduces consumer welfare gains (or increases welfare losses), 
these are likely to be more than offset by the benefits from lower revenue losses and trade 
effects that reduce adjustment costs. This also serves to encourage increased intra-regional 
trade: regional exporters gain from the preservation of their regional market share and in all 
countries domestic producers are likely to produce some regionally traded goods.  
 
 
Key Words: ACP, EPAs, Imports, Welfare Effects, Integration 
 
JEL Classification: F14, F15, F17 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Centre for Research in Economic Development and International Trade, 
University of Nottingham Regional Trade and EPAs 
   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
CREDIT Research Paper 
 
No.    09/05 
 
 





Chris Milner, Oliver Morrissey and Evious Zgovu 
 
Outline 
1  Introduction 
2  Context and Modeling Framework  
3  Impact of EPAs on ACP Imports  
4  Adjustment Effects of EPAs 





The authors are respectively Professor of International Economics, Professor in Development 
Economics and Visiting Research Fellow in CREDIT, School of Economics, University of 
Nottingham. Corresponding author: oliver.morrissey@nottingham.ac.uk.  
 
Acknowledgements 
The basic research was funded by the European Commission under the TRADEAG research 
programme in FP6 (www.tradeag.eu). The views expressed are those of the authors alone and 
should not be attributed to the Commission or other TRADEAG partners. Useful comments 
were received from participants at the UNU-Wider Project Workshop on ‘South-South and 
North-South Trade Agreements: Compatibility Issues’ in Bruges, 5/6 November 2009. 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 





The final details of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and (six) 
ACP regions will be negotiated over the next few years. Framework agreements have 
already been signed (or in some cases initialed) with most ACP countries (typically in 
regional groups, but a few are with individual countries), but these are quite variable in 
commitments, especially regarding the schedule of liberalization and which products are 
classified as sensitive (and hence excluded from liberalization). Although promoting 
regional integration was an objective of EPAs, relatively limited attention has been given 
to how the structure of final agreements could support and facilitate regional integration. 
This paper will consider how EPAs can facilitate intra-regional trade by classifying 
regionally trade goods as sensitive, illustrating the analysis with examples from the 
Caribbean and East Africa.  
Most ex ante studies of the impact of EU-ACP EPA agreements have concentrated on the 
welfare and revenue effects, in particular those arising from the requirement of the ACP 
countries to eliminate (within a maximum of about 23 years) tariffs on substantially all 
imports from the EU (conventionally interpreted as 80%).  This focus is in part because 
these were important negotiation issues, but partly also because effects could be 
estimated with limited information on tariffs and patterns of regional trade.  The 
introduction of reciprocity under an EPA will tend to threaten intra-regional trade in ACP 
groupings for a number of reasons.  There is a direct displacement threat to existing 
regional suppliers from the elimination of the external tariff protection vis-à-vis European 
exporters.  There is also an indirect threat associated with the displacement of domestic 
production by European exporters in domestic markets, which may thereby reduce 
regional production capacity and future prospects for intra-regional exporting. 
These threats to regional trade development can be offset in a number of ways.  Most 
obviously, as negotiations allow for the exclusion of sensitive products and for phased 
introduction of the tariff reductions, ACP regions may benefit by treating products traded 
within the region as sensitive for EPAs, hence avoiding or postponing any reductions on 
tariffs on imports from the EU. Less directly, to the extent that the EU provides ‘aid for 
regional trade’ and support for measures that enhance the productivity and 
competitiveness of domestic producers, export capacity (both intra- and extra-regional) 
can be improved. If EPAs promote increased ACP exports to the EU there is potential to 
benefit from spillovers. 
The results reported and discussed here are based on a number of ex ante studies of the 
trade effects of EPAs on various ACP groupings or countries undertaken by the authors. 
McKay, Miner and Morrissey (2005) analyzed the welfare impacts on the EAC; 
Greenaway and Milner (2006) covered CARICOM and Milner, Morrissey and Zgovu 
(2008) considered aspects of impact and adjustment costs for the EAC and Mauritius.  
Morrissey and Zgovu (2007, 2010) focus on agriculture and total imports respectively for 
a large sample of ACP countries to compare the welfare effects of a full liberalization with 
a scenario that excluded products traded intra-regionally. These studies measured the 
regional trade displacement effects of the liberalization of tariffs on imports from the EU.  
They have not, however, explored in much detail the associated adjustment effects on 
the regional exporting countries, nor have they explicitly considered whether and how 
tariff reforms and other measures can be designed to reduce adverse regional trade 
development effects. The paper outlines how such analysis could be undertaken 
(although doing so is left to future work). 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines the context and empirical 
method applied. Section 2 presents the core results for the welfare effect of import 
liberalization on a sample of ACP countries, first assuming full liberalization and then 
excluding regionally traded products (i.e. treating them as sensitive products, SPs). The 
welfare effects are small relative to GDP, as would be expected, and are positive overall 
and on average. However, between a third (full liberalization) and over half (excluding 




trade effects (increase in imports) are more significant and as the costs of increased 
import competition are concentrated in particular sectors, small welfare effects do not 
imply small adjustment costs. Section 3 shows that the adjustment effects are likely to 
be considerable for Mauritius, suggesting that other ACP countries have legitimate 
concerns. Classifying SPs in a way that shelters intra-regional trade for the adverse 
impact of EPAs can alleviate adjustment costs (and benefit regional exporters), 
especially if intra-regional trade is significant. Section 3 also shows that regional trade is 
important with illustrations from the Caribbean and East Africa. Section 4 concludes with 
an outline of potential future analysis. 
 
 
2   Context and Modeling Framework  
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) require ACP countries to eliminate tariffs on 
most imports from the EU, the impact of which will depend primarily on the structure of 
a country’s imports (EPAs include many other provisions and effects, but the focus here 
is on ACP imports). The impact of eliminating tariffs on most imports from the EU will 
depend on how important the EU is as a source of imports, in general and for particular 
products, and the extent to which these compete with domestic producers or, in an ACP 
region context, regional ACP producers. Net welfare gains are associated with products 
where there are few or no competing domestic (or regional) producers – consumption 
gains from increased cheaper imports and potential welfare gains in sourcing imports 
from more efficient EU producers. There are potential adjustment costs and welfare 
losses where cheaper imports from the EU undermine domestic production or intra-
regional trade or displace more efficient producers in the rest of the world.  
The welfare impact of import liberalisation depends on the production and trade 
structure of the country in question, and as such is an empirical question. Of greater 
practical concern is the potential loss of revenue from tariffs on imports from the EU. On 
the basis of existing signed EPAs, ACP countries have up to 25 years to phase in tariff 
elimination, although some will have eliminated tariffs on most imports by as early as 
2010 (Meyn, 2009). More importantly, ACP countries can exclude a range of designated 
‘sensitive products’ accounting for up to roughly 20% of imports from the EU from tariff 
liberalisation (identifying these is a sticking point in negotiations). Thus, countries do 
have time to plan both their adjustment to the economic effects of increased imports and 
the revenue effect of eliminating tariffs. To design such plans they need information on 
the likely effects of tariff elimination on trade, revenue and welfare. Section 2 provides 
such information for a sample of 34 ACP countries. 
 
Partial Equilibrium Modeling Framework  
With a focus on economic welfare, two effects are of particular importance in any 
analysis of the welfare effect of a regional integration agreement (RIA), which in our 
case is between an ACP region and the EU considered from the perspective of ACP 
imports. We assume that the EU benefits, although we make no attempt to estimate 
this, and focus on the effects on ACP countries. Beneficial trade creation arises where 
inefficient production by domestic firms in the ACP country is displaced by tariff-free 
imports from more efficient producers in the EU. This increases welfare in total through a 
more efficient allocation of production within the RIA. Trade diversion imposes a welfare 
loss where trade from more efficient extra-regional suppliers (ACP imports from the Rest 
of the World, ROW) is diverted to less efficient EU suppliers. For the RIA as a whole, 
welfare increases if trade creation is greater than trade diversion. A third effect is 
important for EPAs as the EU may displace trade within ACP regions, in principle 
benefitting the importing country to the cost of the intra-regional exporter. The partial 
equilibrium analytical framework applied incorporates these three effects. As used by 
McKay et al (2005) and Morrissey and Zgovu (2007, 2009), it extends an established 




(Balassa, 1974; Lyakurwa et al., 1997; Schiff and Winters, 2003) as applied by 
Panagariya (1998) to consider when small countries (in this case ACP) integrate with 
large countries (the EU in this case). 
Although partial equilibrium methods are limited and restrictive, they offer a number of 
advantages over alternative computable general equilibrium (CGE) approaches which 
make them attractive for analysis covering a range of countries (as presented here). 
First, the data requirements are relatively simple: all that is needed are data on imports 
for a representative year disaggregated by source (ACP, EU and ROW) and product, 
whereas CGE analysis requires a model of the structure of the economy (e.g. Matthews 
and Boysen, 2010). This makes it relatively easy to estimate order of magnitude effects 
of alternative liberalization scenarios. Second, the estimates are quite easy to interpret 
as proportional effects relative to initial trade volumes and revenues; consequently, the 
results are quite useful for policy-makers and negotiators. Third, the analysis can be 
conducted at a high level of product disaggregation for any country, which is especially 
useful in assessing the impact of alternative criteria to identify sensitive products (CGE 
analysis typically requires sector aggregation). The results reported here are at an 
aggregate country level as the aim is to cover many ACP countries. When considering 
adjustment implications, as in Section 3, effects at a sector or product level are required. 
There are limitations, although no approach is without weakness. A number of restrictive 
assumptions are required, such as on supply and import demand elasticities, although 
arguably the assumptions are no more restrictive than for alternative methods (and 
results are quite robust to sensitivity checks). More importantly, the analysis is limited to 
static trade effects; it does not allow for effects on or responses by domestic producers, 
or for any effects through factor markets and sector adjustment (but can be extended to 
consider adjustment implications). Furthermore, the analysis does not account for 
changes in partner countries (e.g. if they also reduce tariffs) or the global market (e.g. 
world prices), or for possible changes in demand for exports, for example if trade 
preferences change (as under an EPA); addressing these issues would require a global 
model. The partial equilibrium approach does estimate likely first order effects on 
imports and in principle these could form a basis for more detailed CGE country studies 
where feasible. The estimates are indicative of the potential impact of EPAs on imports in 
ACP countries. 
Results for three effects from the perspective of consumers are estimated and reported 
in the next section. Consumption effects (CE) arise from increased imports at reduced 
prices; if the EU is initially the dominant supplier, the EPA results in pure consumption 
effects only, and this is clearly beneficial. Trade creation (TC) arises in this context when 
imports from the EU displace imports from other ACP countries; assuming the EU is the 
more efficient producer, this increases welfare in the importing country (although 
producers in the exporting ACP country lose).
1 Trade diversion (TD) refers to a situation 
where the elimination of tariffs allows EU suppliers to displace more efficient producers 
in the ROW; this is likely to arise if pre-EPA the ROW is the dominant supplier. 
 
3    Impact of EPAs on ACP imports 
The focus here is on effects through imports for the importing country and the welfare 
effects considering are those for consumers only; revenue impacts are treated 
separately, and producer effects are considered under adjustment costs. In estimating 
effects we begin with the trade data and allocate imports by product into one of three 
cases. If initially the EU is the dominant supplier (accounting for at least 40% of 
                                                           
1  This differs slightly from the standard TC case as the displaced producers are not in the importing country 
(whose welfare is being measured) but in another ACP country (so the producer loss is not included in the 
estimates). As the EU would only displace ACP suppliers if the tariff-free EU price is lower than the ACP 
supplier price, it is assumed that in this case the EU is more efficient. This is not valid if there are other factors 




imports), we assume that all effects are consumption gains (CE only). If the ACP is 
initially a significant supplier (accounting for at least 5% of imports for the product) and 
the EU is a source of imports, we allow for the TC of the EU displacing ACP imports. As 
displacement implies the EU is a more efficient supplier, these effects (TC&CE) are 
positive in terms of importer (consumer) welfare. If initially the ROW is the dominant 
supplier (accounting for at least 40% of imports) but the EU is present in the market, we 
assume that at zero tariffs the EU can displace all imports from the ROW to estimate the 
maximum TD potential (this is therefore unlikely to be the actual impact, but is a useful 
baseline). As the EU is actually less efficient than the ROW, the effect (TD&CE) is 
negative in welfare terms. Results are based on a sample of 34 ACP countries using the 
most recently available data matching imports and import tariff rates; for most countries 
the estimates use data from 2005 or 2006 (see Appendix Table A1 for a list; full details 
are in Morrissey and Zgovu, 2007, 2009).  
 
 
Table 1 ‘Full EPA’ Trade Effects (as % GDP) 
 
Country CE  TC&CE  TD&CE  Welfare 
       
All Countries (34)  0.010  0.001  -0.008  0.004 
Average (34)  0.008  0.005  -0.008  0.004 
Gainers (22)  0.012  0.006  -0.008  0.010 
Losers (12)  0.002  0.002  -0.009  -0.005 
LDCs (13)  0.004  0.004  -0.004  0.004 
Non-LDCs (21)  0.011  0.005  -0.011  0.005 
 
Notes: Figures report consumption effects (CE) only, trade creation (TC) from ACP with CE and trade 
diversion (TD) from ROW with CE. ‘All countries’ is combined total and ‘average’ is sample mean 
(unweighted), all numbers rounded. 
Source: Derived from Table A2. 
 
 
Table 1 summarizes the welfare estimates distinguishing consumption effects (CE), 
TC&CE and TD&CE expressed as a percentage of GDP for the relevant year (note that 
welfare impacts exclude revenue effects). The latter is always negative and both of the 
former are positive (or zero in some cases), so the sign of the overall welfare effect 
depends on the relative magnitudes. For the sample combined (all 34 countries) the 
welfare effect is positive but very small, at 0.004% of GDP (due almost entirely to CE); 
the ACP overall gains. The unweighted mean for the sample (average) is also a positive 
welfare effect of 0.004% of GDP (on average, CE and TD&CE effects ‘cancel out’ so the 
net gain is attributable to TC&CE, i.e. regional imports displaced by more efficient EU 
producers); the average ACP country gains. The aggregate effects are very small relative 
to GDP, but this is typically the case for welfare effects. 
The welfare effects will depend on the structure of imports by source and what is 
happening at an individual product level, in terms of both the ability of the EU to displace 
suppliers from ACP or ROW and the responsiveness of imports to a reduction in tariffs 
(as this determines CE). Overall, 22 countries (two-thirds) experience a net gain and 12 
(one third) experience a net loss (see Table A2). The countries that gain have a lower 
initial share of imports from ROW (41% on average, compared to 76% on average for 
losers, Table A1) but a higher initial share of imports from the EU (30% on average 
compared to an average of 12% for losers). This implies that the CE benefit (0.012% of 
GDP on average) will exceed the TD&CE loss (0.008% on average).  The gainers also 
have higher imports from ACP countries (on average, 29% compared to 12% for losers, 




that these TC gains imply export losses for the initial regional exporters (although not 
incorporated here, this is addressed further below).
2  
The reverse line of argument applies for the losing countries; they import relatively more 
from ROW so TD losses are high (0.009% on average) relative to the gains associated 
with their lower imports from the EU (0.002%) and ACP (0.002%). The overall welfare 
effect is negative for 12 countries, 60% of which are non-LDCs (see Table A2). The 
losers are more likely to be non-LDCs that initially have a relatively high share of imports 
from the ROW. The implication is that the EU has a relatively strong capacity to displace 
some of these ROW imports (large TD effects) and/or import shares or responsiveness 
(elasticity) are relatively low in those products where the EU is dominant.  
There is no difference on average between the 13 LDCs and 21 non-LDCs in the share of 
the EU in total imports (24% in both cases), although LDCs tend to have a higher share 
of imports from ACP (32% compared to 18%, perhaps because they import from but 
export little to neighbouring non-LDCs) and hence a lower share of imports from ROW. 
Although losers are more likely to be non-LDCs, the average non-LDC and LDC gains 
(Table 1). In both cases, positive CE and negative TD cancel out on average so the net 
welfare effect is the TC gain. 
 
Treatment of Sensitive Products 
As the requirement is to liberalise ‘substantially all trade’ this allows ACP countries to 
exempt sensitive products (SPs) from liberalisation; tariffs can be maintained on some 
20% of products (i.e. SPs can be defined so that 20% of imports are excluded). There 
are no clear criteria for which products should be classed as SPs. In designating SPs 
individual ACP countries have typically used criteria based on either revenue or 
protecting domestic producers, which both often mean products where initial tariffs are 
relatively high. While, as discussed below, revenue concerns are important it is not 
necessarily the case that tariffs should be the preferred tax.  
As ACP countries negotiating as regional groups should in principle agree a common list 
of SPs an appropriate criterion is to define as SPs any products imported from the EU 
where other ACP are suppliers. Explicitly, products are classified as SPs (hence excluded) 
if the share of regional (ACP) imports is at least 5%. This criterion addresses concerns 
regarding EU exports depressing regional exports from other ACP countries through the 
trade creation displacement effect. Clearly, this criterion eliminates the ‘TC&CE’ benefits 
and reduces net welfare effects as such trade creation is welfare-improving for the 
importing country. On the other hand, it is an SP criterion that retains benefits to pre-
EPA intra-regional exporters, and as such may reinforce the regional ACP incentive for 
EPAs (as inferred from Table 1, the ACP countries that are more likely to lose from an 
EPA are often non-LDCs more likely to export regionally). 
As long as the EU is already a competitor in these markets the effect of exclusion (SP 
status) will be to reduce CE gains, eliminate TC gains and possibly reduce TD losses. The 
net impact will depend on the combination of trade effects but will reduce gains (from 
the consumer or importing-country perspective) on average and overall. For many ACP 
countries regional imports are a large share of the total (Table A1), but in these cases 
the EU may not be a competitor for some of the products so there is no need to exclude 
them as SPs.  
The estimates of the composition of welfare effects when the ACP supplier criterion is 
applied to exclude SPs are shown in Table 2. It remains true that the ACP overall gains 
although the ‘all countries’ ACP gain falls to 0.002% of GDP and the average gain falls to 
0.001% of GDP; overall and on average gains fall by at least a half. As expected, the TC 
gain is eliminated, and the TD&CE loss and CE gain decline marginally (and by the same 
                                                           
2 As the import data relate to different years (Table A1) it is not possible to associate these imports with the 




amount on average). This clearly reflects the SP criterion in excluding products imported 
from the ACP. It follows that the estimated gain for most countries declines, while the 
estimated welfare loss tends to increase; consequently, a majority of countries (19/34) 
are losers in this scenario (see Table A3). There is no change in the net welfare loss for 
losers on average (the fall in TD losses implies that some of the SPs are imported also 
from ROW), but the average welfare increase for gainers declines considerably (from 
0.01% to 0.004%). It is LDCs that disproportionately bear the brunt of this, as they are 
more likely to import from other ACP countries (the regional ACP exporters are more 
likely to be non-LDCs, and gain on their exports; these gains are not included here). For 
example, the losses of Tanzania (significantly) and Uganda have increased, but Kenya is 
still a net gainer even if the gain halves (see Table A3). 
 
Table 2 ‘EPA with Regional SPs’ Welfare Effects (as % GDP) 
 
Country CE  TD&CE  Welfare 
      
All Countries (34)  0.009  -0.007  0.002 
Average (34)  0.006  -0.006  0.001 
Gainers (22/13)  0.009  -0.005  0.004 
Losers (12/19)  0.002  -0.007  -0.005 
LDCs (13)  0.002  -0.003  -0.001 
Non-LDCs (21)  0.009  -0.007  0.003 
 
Notes: As for Table 1, except products excluded are Sensitive Products (SPs) classified as share of 
regional (ACP) imports equals or exceeds 5%. In all cases TC&CE is zero hence omitted. This 
reduces the number of gainers to 13 and increases the number of losers to 19 (for two countries 
the net welfare effect is zero). 
Source: Derived from Table A3. 
 
 
The welfare effects in most cases are quite small and there are welfare gains for the 
regional ACP exporters that are not included in these estimates. The political benefit 
from supporting intra-regional ACP exporters is likely to outweigh the very small welfare 
costs on importers, especially as the excluded products (SPs) are likely to include 
commodities produced in many ACP countries. It is important to emphasize that whilst 
excluding ACP products from tariff reductions reduces potential gains in importing 
countries, from the (regional) ACP perspective this may be more than offset by producer 
gains in exporting countries. 
 
 Trade and Revenue Effects 
For the ACP sample overall and on average, imports from the EU increase by 8% of their 
pre-EPA level, equivalent to 2-3% of total imports (Table 3). For ‘full liberalization 
(including SPs), countries with an estimated welfare loss experience relatively low 
percentage increases in EU imports (5%) compared to the ACP average. The implication 
is that these increases in imports are displacing imports from the ROW (to the extent 
that this does not occur in practice, we overestimate the adverse welfare impact). 
Gainers on average experience an above average increase in imports from the EU (9%, 
equivalent to 3% of total imports).  It is also evident that imports from the EU increase 
more for non-LDCs than for LDCs in percentage terms (hence non-LDCs on average gain 
in welfare terms). This highlights the fact that it is not the change in total imports that 
matters, but the structure of trade within affected products (specifically, the balance 




reduced considerably, proportionally more for gainers than losers and for LDCs 
compared to non-LDCs, reflecting their trade structures (see Table A4).  
Under full liberalization the welfare effects are likely to be positive but the revenue 
impacts are always negative; overall the potential (maximum) revenue loss is equivalent 
to 31% of tariff revenue from imports, or just below one per cent of GDP, although on 
average the loss is a lower (19%, Table 4). Unsurprisingly, the potential loss is greater 
for gainers (26%), as the gains arise for imports, than losers (8%). Similarly, it is also 
greater for non-LDCs than for LDCs (in principle, tax substitution may be easier for the 
former). Table 4 confirms that the revenue impact is reduced by excluding SPs, to 28% 
(overall) or 15% (average), in both cases to about 0.8% of GDP. With SPs excluded the 
proportional reduction in the revenue impact is greater for LDCs; although (relative to 
non-LDCs) they suffer more (in welfare terms) from excluding ACP imports, they suffer 
less in revenue terms (see Table A5). 
 
Table 3 Effects of EPA on Imports from EU  
 
 Country  Including SPs  Excluding SPs 
 dMeu/Meu  dMeu/M  dMeu/Meu  dMeu/M 
   
All Countries (34)  0.080  0.031  0.069  0.027 
Average (34)  0.077  0.022  0.057  0.016 
Gainers (22)  0.090  0.030  0.064  0.023 
Losers (12)  0.052  0.006  0.044  0.005 
LDCs (13)  0.052  0.013  0.028  0.008 
Non-LDCs (21)  0.092  0.027  0.075  0.022 
 
Notes: See Table 1; figures give proportional change in imports from the EU (dMeu) relative to initial 
level of imports from the EU (Meu) and initial total imports (M). 
Source: Derived from Table A4. 
 
 
Table 4 Revenue Effects of EPA (Imports) 
 
 Country  Including SPs  Excluding SPs 
  dTR/TR dTR/GDP dTR/TR dTR/GDP 
   
All Countries (34)  -31% -0.90% -28% -0.81% 
Average  (34)  -19% -0.98% -15% -0.79% 
Gainers  (22)  -26% -1.39% -19% -1.14% 
Losers  (12)  -8% -0.  22% -6% -0.  16% 
LDCs (13)  -15%  -0. 31%  -9%  -0. 17% 
Non-LDCs  (21)  -22% -1.40% -18% -1.18% 
 
Notes: Figures give change in tariff revenue (dTR) as a percentage of initial tariff revenue on imports 
(TR) and GDP. 
Source: Derived from Table A5. 
 
 
From a revenue perspective the most important products are often ones where either tax 
substitution is feasible or the welfare gains from tariff elimination outweigh the revenue 




‘luxuries’ (such as branded alcohol drinks or high price cars) or petroleum; in these 
cases Excise Duties can relatively easily be substituted for tariffs (in a welfare and 
revenue neutral manner). The latter applies to tariffs on food and intermediate input 
imports; in both cases the gains to consumers (households or firms) outweigh revenue 
losses in welfare terms. This is not to deny the difficulty of finding alternative revenue 
sources but rather emphasizes the desirability of tax structure reform to secure 
alternative revenue sources. The more important is the EU as a source of such imports 
the greater the potential revenue loss; in such cases countries have to decide if the 
purpose of tariffs is to raise revenue or protect domestic producers. When there is little 
or no domestic import-competing production, i.e. domestic demand is met by imports, 
tariffs could easily be replaced with sales taxes (although alternative revenue sources 
may be preferable). 
This leads to a second case where the main purpose of tariffs is to protect domestic 
producers. A simple response is that tariffs are not the best way to support domestic 
producers, so EPA-induced liberalisation may encourage better domestic policies. A more 
sophisticated argument is to ask why liberalisation with respect to the EU only should 
represent a particular challenge to domestic producers. If the effect is diversion from 
ROW to EU (or displacement of ACP by EU if ACP faced tariffs) there is a revenue loss 
but little change from the perspective of domestic producers. Countries have to argue 
that there is something specific to the EU as compared to alternative sources of imports 
that is detrimental to domestic producers. One can envisage such arguments, especially 
to the extent that the EU has not eliminated agriculture subsidies although it committed 
to do so under the (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture, but they are only likely to be 
convincing on a product and country specific basis. This could be explored with the 
method employed here on a country-specific basis, but a more general SP criterion is 
required for analysis across the variety of ACP countries. 
 
4    Adjustment Effects of EPAs 
The net welfare benefits or costs on the import side of introducing reciprocity need to be 
considered against the benefits of continued preferential access for exports to the EU to 
evaluate the overall implications of an EPA in the case of non-LDCs (as LDCs can in 
principle receive tariff-free market access anyway). Although these benefits are positive 
they may not be dramatic.  This is still not a complete evaluation, since the issue of 
short-to medium term adjustment costs must be considered.  These adjustment costs 
will depend on initial characteristics and policy conditions, but can be considered under a 
number of headings: 
 
(i)  Fiscal adjustment  
In order to replace any tariff revenue losses associated with the EPA, ACP countries 
will need to reform the structure of taxation towards non-tariff revenue sources. As 
discussed above, in practice this may not be as difficult as often portrayed, 
especially given the scope for using Excise Duties for high-tariff luxury imports. 
(ii)  Trade facilitation and export diversification  
If the benefits of re-allocating resources (capital, labour, skills and land) away from 
import-competing towards new export activities (under the stimulus of greater 
competition on the home market from EU exporters) are to be reaped, actual and 
potential exporters will need support with developing export products and gaining 
knowledge about export market opportunities. 
(iii)  Production and employment adjustment 
The increased imports from the EU will tend to induce falls in production and 




displaced resources from current (pre-EPA) activities to export sectors will not be 
immediate and smooth, then the ACP countries will need assistance with the 
adjustment experienced by workers (compensation for unemployment, support for 
relocation and retraining) and by firms (closure, production line restructuring etc). 
For intra-regional ACP trade, the proposal of classifying such products as SPs 
reduces the adjustment costs facing ACP regional exporters (typically non-LDCs), 
at least in the medium term. 
(iv)  Skills development and productivity enhancement  
The costs of adjustment (contraction of import-substitution activities and 
expansion of export sectors) will be reduced over time, and scope for dynamic 
benefits from export development will be increased, by increasing productivity 
levels.  This requires support; through the enhancement of workers’ skills, the 
improvement of firm’s organization and management structures and through the 
development of supporting economic policies and infrastructures. 
 
This focus on the process of domestic structural changes associated with the introduction 
of reciprocal import liberalization does not seek to deal with all aspects of the costs of an 
EPA.  For example, if import liberalization induces a rapid growth of imports in excess of 
growth of exports to the EU, then the EPA may induce balance of payments or foreign 
exchange problems.  The issues of macroeconomic policy management in a post-EPA 
environment are not considered.  However, as the partial equilibrium approach to 
estimating impacts is conducted at a disaggregated product level it is possible to identify 
the products and sectors most affected by increased import competition. If this can be 
linked to domestic production and employment data it is possible to estimate the 
adjustment effects. 
 
Illustrative Adjustment Effects (Mauritius) 
Milner  et al (2008) consider implications for adjustment in Mauritius, assuming that 
goods produced locally can be seen as differentiated from regional and extra-regional 
imports, and EU imported varieties as differentiated from extra-regional, rest of the 
world (ROW), varieties. Given differences in technologies and tastes, one might view 
imports in a particular category as differentiated by source of supply.  The approach is to 
identify the trade effects of an EPA and relate these to production and employment 
implications at a sector level. 
It is worth noting that Mauritius is estimated to gain in welfare terms from an EPA 
(Appendix Tables): imports from the EU account for 35% of total imports, and under full 
liberalization the gain is equivalent to 0.014% of GDP (mostly attributable to a CE gain); 
as imports from ACP account for only 10% of the total, the gain remains high under the 
regional SP criterion at 0.01% of GDP (again mostly a CE gain). However, this 
corresponds to a large trade effect as imports from the EU increase by 11% and 9% 
(and total imports by 4% and 3%) under the two scenarios respectively: some domestic 
sectors may face significant increases in import competition. The potential revenue 
losses are also considerable, equivalent to 34% and 23% of total revenue (and 2% and 
1.5% of GDP) under the two scenarios respectively. Thus, the potential adjustment costs 
are high (this is a general point for countries experiencing a welfare increase attributable 
to CE gains). 
As Export Processing Zone (EPZ) firms produce predominantly for export markets and 
their terms of access to the EU are preserved (if not improved) they are unlikely to 
suffer (and may even benefit if imported inputs become cheaper). It is the non-EPZ 
firms that compete with (EU) imports in the domestic market that will bear the brunt of 
adjustment costs. Table 5 summarizes results for production and employment of non-




goods post-EPA in the local and perhaps regional market. These are potential serious 
adjustments for Mauritius to accommodate, with potential knock-on effects for 
production, employment, social conditions and for the government budget.  To illustrate 
just the potential direct employment losses of a full EPA, the estimates are based on 
average employment-gross output ratios to derive the employment impacts 
corresponding to the production effects reported. 
 
 
Table 5: Estimated Percentage Changes in (non-EPZ) Production and 
Employment due to Full EPA (by sector and overall) 
 
 Value  of 
Production  
Change Numbers Employed: 
for Domestic 
Market 
Male Female Total 
Agriculture -7.2%  -6.2%  -7.0%  -6.3% 
Fishing 0%  0%  0%  0% 
Mining & quarrying  0%  0%  0%  0% 
Manufacturing -24.6%  -5.2%  -17.1%  -15.5% 
Total -24.0%  -12.0%  -13.9%  -12.2% 
 
Source: Milner et al (2007, Table 8). 
 
 
The results indicate that production for the domestic market in the primary and 
manufacturing sectors could fall by about 24% if the EPA was implemented in full 
(imports from and exports to other ACP countries are not significant for Mauritius, with 
the exception of trade with South Africa, so the ACP SP criterion would not have a major 
impact).  The bulk of this production loss would be experienced in the manufacturing 
sector, with particularly significant loss in food manufacturing, tobacco products and 
other non-metallic mineral products. 
Based on the average employment-output ratios, the full EPA reduces both male and 
total employment in domestic production by about 12%, and female employment by 
about 14%; male (female) employment falls by 5% (17%) in manufacturing and 6% 
(7%) in agriculture.  This is equivalent to almost 6,800 jobs lost overall directly, and of 
course to more than this if indirect employment effects are allowed for.  Given that it is 
employment in the non-EPZ manufacturing sector that is affected most, the larger 
absolute numbers of job losses are predicted to fall more on male than female workers 
(females are more likely to be employed in the EPZ sector); particularly large job losses 
occur in food products and in non-mineral products. 
A key issue for adjustment is how to facilitate absorption of these workers in expanding 
sectors like tourism and financial services.  In general, financial services require higher 
skills than would generally be found in released workers; at best, allowing for re-
training, the sector could only absorb half of the released workers. Tourism continues to 
expand and is clearly a vital sector to the economy, with a better potential fit with the 
skills of released workers. Whilst it is possible that financial services and tourism can 
absorb the released workers, both would be competing for the more skilled workers and 
the age structure of Mauritius means that there are many new, typically educated, 




specific skills will therefore be required even to maintain employment levels. The basic 
conclusion is that accommodating potential employment losses will be difficult, and this 
may be the most difficult adjustment issue in all ACP countries. 
 
Importance of Intra-Regional Trade 
The principal reason that Mauritius stands to experience a welfare gain but high 
adjustment costs from an EPA is because the EU accounts for a relatively large share of 
imports. As ACP imports are a relatively small share of the total, excluding these as SPs 
does not have a major effect (although, to the extent that some of these are produced 
domestically it may reduce adjustment costs). However, for countries with significant 
intra-regional trade the ‘ACP SP’ criterion can have a significant effect. Although 
excluding the SPs will tend to reduce welfare costs it also reduces the increase in imports 
from the EU, hence reduces revenue losses (in practice only slightly as regional imports 
are typically at preferential rates)
3 and adjustment costs. Regional exporters gain, and 
so do importers to the extent that they produce similar products domestically (and, even 
where there are regional imports, domestic producers should be more competitive with 
regional imports). 
Regional imports are significant for many Caribbean countries; for those listed in the 
Appendix Tables, with the exception of Belize, imports from ACP are 15-33% of total 
imports and a greater share than imports from the EU (Table A1). Although excluding 
SPs makes the welfare effects slightly more negative, it has a more noticeable effect in 
reducing the trade effect and revenue losses. Greenaway and Milner (2006) looked at 
the impact of EPAs on CARICOM, noting that a full liberalization scenario implies roughly 
a 25% reduction in regional (Caribbean) imports for the nine Caribbean countries 
covered (including those listed in the Appendix Tables). The basic point is that intra-
regional trade is important, in both agriculture (food) and basic manufactures. These are 
products where the EU could in principle compete (if granted zero tariffs), although 
perhaps not to a large extent given the proximity of the US. Excluding regionally traded 
goods from EPA liberalization could support intra-Caribbean trade, even if it does not 
stimulate increased trade, and reduce the adjustment costs associated with an EPA. 
A similar argument can be made for the East African Community (EAC): ACP imports 
account for 13-24% of total imports, a greater share than the EU (Table A1). For 
Tanzania and Uganda, excluding SPs worsens the welfare effect but significantly reduces 
the revenue losses and trade effect (Appendix Tables). Jones and Morrissey (2008) note 
that while intra-regional trade is small relative to the total trade of the member 
countries, it can be quite significant in particular sectors for Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda. In general, Kenya supplies light manufactures and some processed foods to 
Tanzania and Uganda, whereas the latter mostly supply foods to the others. Intra-
regional trade is quite significant for the non-LDC: in 2004 Kenya accounted for 21 per 
cent of Ugandan imports and five per cent of Tanzania’s imports, although neither 
Tanzania nor Uganda were important sources of Kenyan imports. Kenya accounts for by 
far the greater share of intra-regional trade and, unlike the other countries, supplies 
manufactures or semi-processed goods. The EAC provides over a fifth of Uganda’s 
imports, over five per cent of Tanzania’s but less than two per cent of Kenya’s (mostly 
some foods). 
This understates the importance of intra-regional trade for each country. For Kenya in 
2004, Uganda accounted for ten per cent of exports and Tanzania for almost seven per 
cent. For Tanzania, six per cent of exports went to Kenya and about one per cent to 
Uganda. For Uganda, twelve per cent of exports went to Kenya and two per cent to 
Tanzania. This does not imply that there are no potential gains for Tanzania and Uganda, 
                                                           
3 In cases where the ACP region itself establishes a free trade Customs Union (e.g. the EAC) there will be an 
associated loss of revenue. Typically this will be small relative to the EPA effect and is distinct from the EPA 




as opportunities for them to supply food to the regional market could be beneficial. 
Intra-regional trade in food provides an outlet for local (seasonal) surpluses, especially 
in regions closer to neighbouring countries than their own urban markets (given the low 
level of regional market integration); could encourage crop diversification and the 
development of traders and distribution networks; and could help to smooth regional and 
seasonal price instability. The EAC is actually an important destination for exports of the 
member countries, accounting for some 17 per cent of Kenyan exports, over seven per 
cent for Tanzania and about 14 per cent for Uganda. The main implication is that the 
‘ACP SP’ criterion could be quite important for preserving regional market shares in 
intra-EAC trade. It is also likely to reduce adjustment costs (especially for Kenya, which 
experiences by far the largest CE gain hence faces greater potential adjustment). 
Although there are potential advantages with the SP criterion proposed here, the effects 
will differ across ACP countries that trade with each other. In general, the regional 
exporter (typically a non-LDC) derives the greatest gains, while the calculus for regional 
importers (typically LDCs) depends on which imports domestic producers compete with. 
Boysen and Matthews (2008) note that Ugandan producers tend not to compete with EU 
imports but do compete with some imports from Kenya. From the perspective of 
protecting domestic producers (minimizing adjustment costs) a selective ‘Ugandan SP’ 
criterion may appear better than an ‘EAC SP’ criterion because it could target exclusion 
on products of particular interest to Uganda. However, as the EAC has established a 
Customs Union with a common external tariff and in principle free internal trade, 
agreeing a common SP list seems logical (although it has not yet been agreed). In these 
circumstances countries like Uganda will need to consider which sectors will face 
adjustment costs (from whatever source) and how they can most effectively be assisted. 
Existing economic studies offer little guidance in this regard as typically they estimate 
the impact of EPA scenarios without full regional integration, or of regional integration 
with EPAs. In practice, they two are often happening together. 
 
5    Implications for EPAs 
On face value, the analysis suggests that ACP countries should not be excessively 
concerned about the impact of EPAs on imports: even assuming ‘immediate’ complete 
elimination of all tariffs on imports from the EU, and when excluding up to 20% of 
imports as sensitive products, ACP countries on average are likely to experience welfare 
gains. When not excluding SPs, most LDCs (nine out of 13) and non-LDCs (14 out of 21) 
gain. As is typical with estimates of welfare impacts, the overall effect relative to GDP 
tends to be very small, whether positive or negative. This is the most important 
conclusion. Excluding SPs, and the chosen criteria of classifying imports from ACP 
countries (that compete with EU imports) as SPs, reduces the overall and average gains 
(by a half or more) and alters the distribution; those with relatively more ACP imports 
are worse off, but this should be set against the gain to regional exporters. 
However, small welfare gains (or losses) do not imply that adjustment costs are small. 
As the gains are associated with increased imports from the EU, larger welfare gains 
tend to be associated with larger revenue losses and adjustment costs. While potential 
tariff revenue losses are non-negligible, given that countries have at least ten years in 
which to implement the tariff reductions, there is scope for tax substitution. For some 
products with the greatest revenue impact (imports from the EU facing relatively high 
initial tariffs) it is relatively easy to replace tariffs with Excise Duties. In other cases, 
such as foods or imported inputs, the consumer gains of tariff reductions are likely to 
outweigh any producer losses in welfare terms – finding an alternative to tariffs may 
itself be a desirable tax reform. Concern over revenue effects is justified but not a good 
criterion for selecting SPs or rejecting tariff reductions. 
The simulations reported excluded products where ACP imports compete with the EU as 
this protects regional trade and SPs have to be agreed at the regional ACP level. In 




welfare loss) compared to estimates where no products are excluded. This was to be 
expected as if ACP products are excluded as SPs the potential trade creation gains are 
reduced. As the partial equilibrium method only considers the welfare effect on imports, 
and hence on countries as importers, it does not allow for the potential loss of ACP 
regional exporters displaced by competition from the EU in regional markets. As non-
LDCs are more likely to be regional exporters, especially in manufacturing, the estimates 
may understate their losses. On the other hand, it is the non-LDCs who stand to gain 
most from increased trade preferences in access to the EU under an EPA, and the ACP 
import criterion for SPs preserves their regional market. As such, this criterion may be 
politically attractive within ACP negotiating regions (LDCs that export regionally, often 
some agriculture products, also gain). 
An inherent limitation of the partial equilibrium approach is that it does not allow for 
effects on domestic producers – the welfare effects are based on consumers (of 
imports). Nevertheless, the partial approach does help to identify products where the 
trade and welfare effects are likely to be large. Country analysis could then relate this to 
production data for the relevant sectors, and some of the issues were illustrated. 
Notably, intra-regional trade is significant for many if not most ACP countries; this is 
shown for the Caribbean and East Africa. Analyzing this in more detail, and the related 
issue of analyzing adjustment effects (which, as illustrated, may be most important for 
employment), requires sector level data, on the trade effects of EPAs and for domestic 
production. The partial equilibrium analysis reported here provides the sector level 
impacts of EPAs which can then be related to domestic production and employment. As 
shown for Mauritius, even if the welfare effects appear small (and the large revenue 
impacts can be addressed with tax substitution), there may be significant production and 
employment losses (concentrated in particular sectors). We leave it to future work to 
collect domestic production data to elaborate the adjustment effects along the lines 
suggested, but estimates for Mauritius suggest that these may be much larger than 
implied by the relatively small welfare effects.  
Classifying regionally traded goods as SPs to exclude from liberalization may have a 
small effect on reducing welfare gains or increasing welfare losses, but these are likely to 
be more than offset by the benefits. Revenue losses and trade effects are reduced 
(imports from the EU increase by less), which reduces adjustment costs. Regional 
exporters gain most from the preservation of their regional market share. However, in all 
countries domestic producers are likely to produce some regionally trade goods and are 
better able to compete with regional compared to extra-regional imports, so adjustments 
costs are likely to be lower in most ACP countries. Excluding regionally traded goods can 
also serve to encourage increased intra-regional trade.  
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APPENDIX TABLE A1 Imports by Source 
 
Country Year  ACP  EU  ROW 
        
Antigua and Barbuda  2005 16%  11%  72% 
Bahamas, The  2001 1%  2%  96% 
Belize  2006 3%  5%  92% 
Benin  2005 27%  38%  34% 
Burkina Faso  2004 35%  30%  35% 
Cameroon  2006 36%  34%  30% 
Central African Republic  2005 29%  21%  50% 
Cote d'Ivoire  2006 32%  39%  28% 
Dominica  2006 33%  13%  55% 
Dominican Republic  2001 1%  13%  86% 
Gabon  2006 8%  67%  25% 
Ghana  2006 20%  36%  44% 
Grenada  2005 24%  15%  62% 
Guyana  2006 36%  10%  54% 
Jamaica  2006 15%  10%  76% 
Kenya  2004 13%  25%  62% 
Madagascar  2006 11%  23%  65% 
Malawi  2006 62%  15%  23% 
Mali  2004 45%  31%  24% 
Mauritius  2006 10%  35%  55% 
Mozambique  2006 47%  14%  39% 
Niger  2005 33%  24%  43% 
Nigeria  2003 5%  33%  62% 
Papua New Guinea  2003 1%  2%  97% 
Senegal  2006 13%  52%  36% 
Seychelles  2006 11%  33%  56% 
South Africa  2006 3%  53%  44% 
Sudan  2005 2%  23%  75% 
Tanzania  2006 18%  17%  65% 
Togo  2005 17%  42%  41% 
Trinidad and Tobago  2006 18%  11%  72% 
Uganda  2006 24%  19%  57% 
Zambia  2006 61%  12%  28% 
Zimbabwe  2005 76%  7%  17% 
Average (All 34)    23% 24% 53% 
LDCs (13)    32% 24% 45% 
Non-LDCs (21)    18% 24% 58% 
Gainers (22)    29% 30% 41% 
Losers (12)    12% 12% 76% 
 
Notes: The countries highlighted in bold are classified as LDCs; Year refers to the 
year for which data were used. 




Table A2 Composition of Trade Effects (as % GDP) 
 
Country CE  TC&CE  TD&CE  Welfare 
       
All Countries (34)  0.010  0.001  -0.008  0.004 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA   0.005  0.005  -0.015  -0.004 
BAHAMAS   0.000  0.000  -0.023  -0.023 
BELIZE   0.003  0.000  -0.008  -0.004 
BENIN   0.009  0.002  -0.005  0.006 
BURKINA FASO   0.003  0.001  0.000  0.004 
CAMEROON   0.007  0.005  -0.004  0.008 
CENTRAL AFRICA REP   0.002  0.003  -0.004  0.001 
COTE D'IVOIRE   0.013  0.001  -0.004  0.011 
DOMINICA   0.003  0.008  -0.015  -0.004 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC   0.001  0.000  -0.007  -0.005 
GABON   0.019  0.001  -0.004  0.016 
GHANA   0.009  0.001  -0.010  0.001 
GRENADA   0.004  0.016  -0.017  0.003 
GUYANA   0.004  0.024  -0.018  0.011 
JAMAICA   0.000  0.002  -0.011  -0.008 
KENYA   0.007  0.002  -0.005  0.004 
MADAGASCAR   0.002  0.001  -0.004  -0.001 
MALAWI   0.004  0.010  -0.002  0.012 
MALI   0.004  0.003  -0.001  0.006 
MAURITIUS   0.020  0.003  -0.010  0.014 
MOZAMBIQUE   0.002  0.006  -0.005  0.003 
NIGER   0.004  0.008  -0.004  0.007 
NIGERIA   0.020  0.002  -0.019  0.003 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA   0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.001 
SENEGAL   0.017  0.001  -0.008  0.010 
SEYCHELLES   0.081  0.012  -0.030  0.062 
SOUTH AFRICA   0.013  0.000  -0.006  0.006 
SUDAN   0.003  0.000  -0.005  -0.002 
TANZANIA   0.005  0.003  -0.009  -0.001 
TOGO   0.006  0.007  -0.008  0.005 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO   0.001  0.000  -0.006  -0.005 
UGANDA   0.001  0.002  -0.004  -0.001 
ZAMBIA   0.001  0.006  -0.002  0.005 
ZIMBABWE   0.004  0.013  -0.006  0.011 
Average 0.008  0.005  -0.008  0.004 
 
Notes: Figures report consumption effects (CE) only, trade creation (TC) from ACP 
with CE and trade diversion (TD) from ROW with CE. Countries with overall 
welfare losses are highlighted in italics; ‘All countries’ is combined total and 
‘average’ is sample mean (unweighted), all numbers rounded. 
 
 





Table A3 Welfare Effects excluding SPs (as % GDP) 
 
Country CE  TC&CE  TD&CE  Welfare 
       
All Countries (34)  0.009 0.000  -0.007 0.002 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA   0.004  0.000  -0.009  -0.005 
BAHAMAS   0.000  0.000  -0.023  -0.023 
BELIZE   0.003  0.000  -0.007  -0.003 
BENIN   0.005  0.000  -0.004  0.002 
BURKINA FASO   0.003  0.000  0.000  0.002 
CAMEROON   0.006  0.000  -0.004  0.003 
CENTRAL AFRICA REP   0.000  0.000  -0.003  -0.003 
COTE D'IVOIRE   0.012  0.000  -0.003  0.009 
DOMINICA   0.002  0.000  -0.008  -0.006 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC   0.001  0.000  -0.007  -0.005 
GABON   0.015  0.000  -0.003  0.012 
GHANA   0.007  0.000  -0.006  0.001 
GRENADA   0.003  0.000  -0.010  -0.007 
GUYANA   0.004  0.000  -0.011  -0.007 
JAMAICA   0.000  0.000  -0.008  -0.008 
KENYA   0.006  0.000  -0.003  0.002 
MADAGASCAR   0.002  0.000  -0.003  -0.001 
MALAWI   0.002  0.000  0.000  0.001 
MALI   0.002  0.000  -0.001  0.001 
MAURITIUS   0.017  0.000  -0.006  0.010 
MOZAMBIQUE   0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.001 
NIGER   0.002  0.000  -0.003  0.000 
NIGERIA   0.011  0.000  -0.017  -0.007 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA   0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.001 
SENEGAL   0.014  0.000  -0.006  0.008 
SEYCHELLES   0.075  0.000  -0.010  0.065 
SOUTH AFRICA   0.013  0.000  -0.006  0.006 
SUDAN   0.003  0.000  -0.005  -0.002 
TANZANIA   0.002  0.000  -0.006  -0.004 
TOGO   0.004  0.000  -0.007  -0.002 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO   0.001  0.000  -0.006  -0.005 
UGANDA   0.000  0.000  -0.002  -0.002 
ZAMBIA   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
ZIMBABWE   0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.000 
Average 0.006  0  -0.006  0.001 
 
Notes: As for Table A2, except products excluded are Sensitive Products (SPs) 









Table A4 Trade Effects of EPA on Imports from EU (%) 
 
 Country  Including SPs  Excluding SPs 
 dMeu/Meu  dMeu/M  dMeu/Meu  dMeu/M 
   
All Countries (34)  0.080 0.031 0.069 0.027 
Antigua & Barbuda  0.084 0.010 0.076 0.009 
Bahamas, The  0.015 0.000 0.014 0.000 
Belize  0.162 0.009 0.160 0.008 
Benin  0.114 0.044 0.068 0.026 
Burkina Faso  0.044 0.013 0.037 0.011 
Cameroon  0.120 0.040 0.106 0.036 
Central African Rep  0.056 0.012 0.009 0.002 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.103 0.040 0.095 0.037 
Dominica  0.041 0.005 0.029 0.004 
Dominican Republic  0.050 0.006 0.050 0.006 
Gabon  0.157 0.105 0.124 0.083 
Ghana  0.063 0.023 0.050 0.018 
Grenada  0.041 0.006 0.030 0.004 
Guyana  0.044 0.004 0.040 0.004 
Jamaica  0.010 0.001 0.008 0.001 
Kenya  0.104 0.026 0.081 0.020 
Madagascar  0.031 0.007 0.026 0.006 
Malawi  0.048 0.007 0.021 0.003 
Mali  0.046 0.014 0.018 0.006 
Mauritius  0.105 0.036 0.085 0.029 
Mozambique  0.036 0.005 0.009 0.001 
Niger  0.074 0.018 0.047 0.011 
Nigeria  0.232 0.077 0.126 0.042 
Papua New Guinea  0.064 0.001 0.064 0.001 
Senegal  0.079 0.041 0.068 0.035 
Seychelles  0.270 0.090 0.249 0.083 
South Africa  0.065 0.035 0.065 0.035 
Sudan  0.045 0.010 0.045 0.010 
Tanzania  0.087 0.015 0.032 0.006 
Togo  0.047 0.020 0.036 0.015 
Trinidad & Tobago  0.026 0.003 0.020 0.002 
Uganda  0.013 0.002 0.004 0.001 
Zambia  0.032 0.004 0.006 0.001 
Zimbabwe  0.094 0.007 0.031 0.002 
Average  0.077 0.022 0.057 0.016 
 
Notes: Figures in % give change in imports from the EU (dMeu) relative to initial 
level of imports from the EU (Meu) and initial total imports (M). 




Table A5 Revenue Effects of EPA (Imports) 
 
 Country  Including SPs  Excluding SPs 
  dTR/TR dTR/GDP dTR/TR dTR/GDP 
   
All  Countries  -31% -0.90% -28% -0.81% 
Antigua & Barbuda  -12%  -0.63% -9% -0.49% 
Bahamas, The  0% -0.02% 0% -0.01% 
Belize  -11% -0.44% -11% -0.42% 
Benin  -37% -0.87% -25% -0.58% 
Burkina Faso  -19% -0.23% -13% -0.16% 
Cameroon  -29% -0.69% -25% -0.60% 
Central African Rep  -13%  -0.26% -1% -0.03% 
Cote d'Ivoire  -53% -1.25% -48% -1.15% 
Dominica  -6% -0.42% -3% -0.19% 
Dominican Republic  -8% -0.14% -8% -0.14% 
Gabon  -59% -1.64% -50% -1.40% 
Ghana  -27% -0.98% -21% -0.76% 
Grenada  -7% -0.46% -4% -0.28% 
Guyana  -8% -0.52% -6% -0.38% 
Jamaica  -3% -0.09% -1% -0.04% 
Kenya  -22% -0.62% -16% -0.43% 
Madagascar  -16% -0.19% -12% -0.14% 
Malawi  -7% -0.36% -3% -0.14% 
Mali  -21% -0.17% -13% -0.11% 
Mauritius  -34% -2.12% -23% -1.46% 
Mozambique  -8% -0.21% -1% -0.04% 
Niger  -19% -0.44% -10% -0.23% 
Nigeria  -24% -1.33% -19% -1.06% 
Papua New Guinea  -5% -0.05% -5% -0.05% 
Senegal  -43% -1.45% -36% -1.20% 
Seychelles  -51% -14.55% -47% -13.43% 
South Africa  -43% -1.09% -43% -1.09% 
Sudan  -15% -0.15% -15% -0.15% 
Tanzania  -12%  -0.41% -4% -0.15% 
Togo  -24% -0.55% -19% -0.43% 
Trinidad & Tobago  -5% -0.08% -4% -0.06% 
Uganda  -5% -0.07% -2% -0.02% 
Zambia  -4% -0.10% -1% -0.01% 
Zimbabwe  -12%  -0.77% -2% -0.12% 
Average  -19% -0.98% -15% -0.79% 
 
Notes: Figures give change in tariff revenue (dTR) as a percentage of initial tariff 
revenue on imports (TR) and GDP. 
 
 
 